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Abstract 
International migration implies the coexistence of different ethnic and cultural groups in the receiving 
country. The refugee crisis of 2015 has resulted in critical levels of opinion polarization on the 
question of whether to welcome migrants, causing clashes in receiving countries. This scenario 
emphasizes the need to better understand the dynamics of mutual adaptation between locals and 
migrants, and the conditions that favor successful integration. Agent-based simulations can help 
achieve this goal. In this work, we introduce our model MigrAgent and our preliminary results. The 
model synthesizes the dynamics of migration intake and post-migration adaptation. It explores the 
different acculturation outcomes that can emerge from the mutual adaptation of a migrant population 
and a local population depending on their degree of tolerance. With parameter sweeping, we detect 
how different acculturation strategies can coexist in a society and in different degrees among various 
subgroups. The results show higher polarization effects between a local population and a migrant 
population for fast intake conditions. When migrant intake is slow, transitory conditions between 
acculturation outcomes emerge for subgroups, e.g., from assimilation to integration for liberal 
migrants and from marginalization to separation for conservative migrants. Relative group sizes due 
to speed of intake cause counterintuitive scenarios, such as the separation of liberal locals. We 
qualitatively compare the processes of our model with the German portion sample of the survey 
“Causes and Consequences of Socio-Cultural Integration Processes among New Immigrants in 
Europe” (SCIP), finding preliminary confirmation of our assumptions and results. 
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Introduction 
International migration implies individuals or entire populations crossing international boundaries 
(International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2017). It is a complex phenomenon common in 
human history that connects people from different cultures and historical backgrounds. 
Understanding the consequences of international migration for receiving societies has become more 
important considering the increase in migration flows to Europe and other global destinations since 
2015, namely due to the refugee crisis (European Commission [EC], 2015; Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2015). At the peak of the crisis, as reported by 
the European Commission (2015), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] 
confirmed that 1,015,078 migrants had reached Europe via the Mediterranean Sea in 2015. As 
Eurostat (2017) has reported, EU countries approved 307,650 asylum requests during 2015, and the 
number increased in 2016 to 672,890 requests accepted. In 2016, Germany approved 433,905 
requests, while Sweden approved 66,585 and Italy 35,405. Although the peak of the refugee crisis is 
likely in the past (UNHCR, 2017), factors such as climate change might increase migration pressure 
in the future due to floods, droughts and associated conflicts. For example, Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, 
Saeger and Kushnir (2015) have linked the conflict in Syria and the associated refugee crisis to 
unprecedented droughts in the region. 
The consequences of such migration for receiving countries are evident. A survey by the Pew 
Research Center (Wike, Stokes & Simmons, 2016) has demonstrated opinion polarization in 
European countries due to the refugee crisis. For example, the discussions on Brexit focused on, 
among other topics, the sovereignty of the UK in the context of refugee acceptance. On the one hand, 
many Europeans consider refugees as unwilling to integrate and as representing a threat to the stability 
and economy of their nations (Wike et al., 2016). On the other hand, many support the urgent calls to 
open borders and accept refugees as a form of humanitarian aid (Wike et al., 2016). This internal 
chasm regarding the acceptance of migrants is more evident than at earlier stages of European history 
(OECD, 2015). Additionally, many asylum seekers who have been granted the status of humanitarian 
migrants are likely to settle in Europe in the long term. As social scientists, we are interested in the 
consequences of this scenario as regards the cohesion of the receiving societies and the integration of 
migrants. 
Facing these issues requires one to consider the dynamics of acculturation in the context of continuous 
first-hand contact between members of different cultures (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936). A 
prominent model in the field of acculturation studies is the fourfold model proposed by Berry (1984, 
2005), which identifies acculturation as a mutually adaptive process between a local community and 
migrant minorities. It assumes that acculturation occurs at two levels: (1) a cultural-group level made 
up of norms and (2) a psychological-individual level concerning the individual experience of 
adaptation (Berry, 1984, 2005). The model is based on the orientations people adopt to face issues 
related to maintaining their own cultural identities and participating in the larger society. Four 
orientations emerge from the intersection of the two distinct dimensions: 
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● Integration: high maintenance of one’s own culture, frequent interactions with the other group 
● Assimilation: low maintenance of one’s own culture, frequent interactions with the other 
group 
● Separation: high maintenance of one’s own culture, infrequent interactions with the other 
group 
● Marginalization: low maintenance of one’s own culture, infrequent interactions with the other 
group 
 
The most recent elaborations of the model have associated societal ideologies with the different 
orientations (Berry, 2005, 2017). Integration is associated with multicultural societies and people able 
to navigate the features of different cultures. Assimilation entails melting pot policies and 
incorporation within the receiving society. Separation means segregation between ethnic groups, 
while marginalization is associated with exclusion. Regardless of the original focus on the 
orientations, Berry’s categories are universally recognized as a typological model describing the 
range of possibilities regarding how people situate themselves and participate in different cultural 
groups (Nguyen & Benet-Martinez, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 1. Acculturation orientations and societal profiles. Adapted from Berry (2005) 
 
Many social science studies have explored what processes favor one strategy over another and how 
desired integration outcomes can be reached (Ward & Kus, 2012). The dynamics of acculturation are 
influenced by many factors. In this paper, we focus on the role of tolerance for both the receiving 
community and migrants. Apparently simple in its meaning, the term tolerance, when applied to 
integration in a diverse context, is of interest in domains ranging from social science research (Brewer 
& Pierce, 2005) to policy design (Verkuyten, Yogeeswaran, & Adelman, 2018). In this context, 
tolerance implies acceptance despite recognition and disapproval of diversity (van Doorn, 2014). 
Nevertheless, as Verkuyten et al. (2018) have highlighted, in most social sciences fields, tolerance is 
synonymous with openness to cultural others or a generalized “positive attitude” (p.10) towards them. 
Both meaning highlight the role of tolerance as an antecedent of network formation in a multicultural 
context due to migration flows. Roccas and Brewer (2002) have demonstrated that low levels of 
tolerance towards outgroups (e.g., migrants and those of different race) are associated with 
conservatism values, which motivate people to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity. On the other hand, 
tolerance can cause group cohesion to fracture. On a personal level, tolerant people might prefer 
tolerant people of other groups over conservative members of their own group (Verkuyten, 2010). 
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Conversely, conservative people might reject tolerant members of their same group for holding 
different values (Verkuyten, 2010). Moreover, conservative people might openly condemn the 
acceptance of cultural others by members of their own group out of a sense of ethnic loyalty (Padilla 
& Perez, 2003). 
Even if tolerance is accepted as a possible predictor of migrant integration, an important question is 
how it actually modulates the mutual adaptation between locals and migrants. The contact hypothesis, 
stating how positive contact between groups reduces prejudice, can fit this interest (Allport, 1954). 
Although this assumption is not completely new within acculturation studies (Berry, 1984), it has 
received more emphasis in recent years (Berry, 2017). Even though reciprocity in social interactions 
is recognized as a fundamental element of network formations and their consolidation (Stark, 2015), 
the dynamics of the process are complex and conclusions not obvious. Research has clearly 
demonstrated that positive intergroup interaction reduces prejudice towards outgroups (Dovidio, 
Eller, & Hewstone, 2011). Nevertheless, Riek, Mania and Gaertner (2006) have shown that negative 
intergroup experiences, either real or imagined, increase negative attitudes towards outgroups. Due 
to this complexity, many scholars have highlighted the need to more effectively address the 
interactions occurring in the ecological contexts of acculturation and the ways in which they condition 
integration processes (Ward & Geeraert, 2016; Berry, 2017). 
We believe that knowledge of how tolerance influences the social dynamics of mutual adaptation 
between locals and migrants in relation to network formation is crucial for understanding how 
polarizing opinions on out-groups can influence future integration scenarios. Agent-based modelling 
can be useful in this regard for several reasons. First, agent-based modelling allows researchers to 
translate their own hypotheses on social processes into distributed actions of individuals in artificial 
societies (Macy & Willer, 2002). For this reason, agent-based modelling is the only method able to 
simulate and explore the emergence of complex social phenomena linking the micro-level of 
individual behavior with the macro-level of observed social phenomena (Edmonds & Meyer, 2017; 
Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005). Second, model building allows us to compare different types of artificial 
societies, so to embrace the complexity necessary to disentangle conditions and processes underlying 
social phenomena such as the contact hypothesis. Lastly, what-if scenarios allow us to connect 
different processes that can contribute to integration outcomes in a sequential order, a feat that 
variable-based models are not capable of (Squazzoni, Jager & Edmonds, 2013). As in the case of 
acculturation studies, the clarification of mechanisms requires examining the relationship among 
migration flows, speed of intake, network formation and changes in tolerance as an effect of 
reciprocity. 
In sum, following Edmonds (2017), we propose using agent-based modelling to explain some 
plausible social mechanisms underlying the emergence of acculturation within Berry’s typological 
model in a migration context. To that end, we developed the MigrAgent model, which this paper 
presents. In our model, we focus on the role of tolerance and reciprocity in intergroup network 
formation. In the first experiments described in this paper, we compare different societies in terms of 
their level of conservatism and simulate migration flows using varying speed of intakes. Our aim is 
to determine what type of acculturation emerges for different strata of society from these scenarios. 
In this preliminary work, we qualitatively compare the assumptions of our model and observed 
processes with data from the survey Causes and Consequences of Socio-Cultural Integration 
Processes among New Immigrants in Europe (SCIP) collected in Germany. 
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Model Description 
MigrAgent was built using NetLogo 6.04, and it is currently available at the CoMSES Computational 
Model Library, see section Additional Information. In the model, the world is split between a home 
country and a host country. Local agents (blue color tag) reside in the host country, and migrant 
agents (green color tag) reside in the home country. Once the simulation starts, migrant agents move 
from the home country to the host country according to speed of intake, which represent the random 
probability of an agent to move to the host country. No agent, whether local or migrant, can leave the 
host country. The three main dynamics of the simulation occur in the host country in a circular way. 
The first dynamic is group aggregation based on agents’ attachment preferences; together with the 
speed of intake, this variable influences spatial sorting and the probability of interaction between 
agents. The second dynamic is the acceptance or rejection of intergroup interactions based on the 
tolerance of the receiver. The last dynamic is the change in tolerance as a function of reciprocity (see 
Figure 2). Table 1 summarizes the parameters and the attributes of the agents. 
Following Berry’s description of acculturation as involving group-level norms (2005), we included a 
group-level dimension of conservatism to simulate tolerance. The collective conservatism of each 
ethnic group ranges from -1 and +1. The individual level of conservatism of each agent at the start of 
the simulation runs (time step 0) is determined according to a normal distribution with mean equal to 
the collective conservatism of the own ethnic group and standard deviation of 0.45. The individual 
level of conservatism of each agent then changes as a dynamic variable according to their experience 
of rejection or acceptance in intergroup interactions, as described below. Values of individual 
conservatism below 0 denote liberal agents (bright color tag); values of conservatism equal to or 
higher than 0 denote conservative agents (dark color tag). In using the terms conservative and liberal 
agents, we do not refer to any political or philosophical interpretation, but to agents with a low level 
of tolerance (conservatives) or a high level of tolerance (liberals). Thus, four types of agents interact 
in our simulation: liberal locals (bright blue), conservative locals (dark blue), liberal migrants (bright 
green) and conservative migrants (dark green). Ethnicity is a fixed state, and conservatism is a 
dynamic state. 
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Parameter Type Range Function 
number_local integer [0,1000] number of local agents 
conservatism_local continuous [-1,1] mean in normal distribution of 
local agents’ conservatism. 
standard deviation = 0.45 
number_migrant integer [0,1000] number of migrant agents 
conservatism_migrant continuous [-1,1] mean in normal distribution of 
migrant agents’ conservatism. 
standard deviation = 0.45 
speed_intake integer [1,100] speed of intake: percentage of 
migrant agents moving 
simultaneously to host country 
Agents attributes Type Range Tag and Action 
ethnicity fixed [local, migrant] blue color: local 
green color: migrant 
conservatism dynamic  [-∞,+∞] liberal agents [< 0]:  
bright ethnicity color 
conservative agents [≥ 0]: 
dark ethnicity color 
happy? boolean [true, false] liberal agents: fraction liberal 
agents in-radius 1.5 ≥ 0.5 
conservative agents: fraction 
conservative same ethnicity in-
radius 1.5 ≥ 0.5 
Table 1. Parameters of MigrAgent model 
 
We designed our model based on Schelling’s dynamics of segregation (1971), although we did not 
literally copy the rules of his model. We took the core assumption that individual homophily 
preferences can lead to high levels of segregation. Although Schelling’s model is usually applied to 
spatial segregation, we applied it to network aggregation. Our idea was that people’s segregation 
under certain homophily preferences limits individuals’ opportunities to interact with members of 
other groups, regardless of their willingness to engage in such interactions. In our adaptation, liberal 
agents consider as similar other agents based on their attitude, not their ethnicity. They prefer for their 
proximal neighborhood to be home to agents with low conservatism, independent of their ethnicity, 
and for that neighborhood to exclude conservative agents, including those of their own group. 
Conservative agents instead consider as similar agents sharing both their ethnicity and their high level 
of conservatism. Thus, conservative agents reject both liberals of their own ethnic group and agents 
of different ethnicities. They prefer being in neighborhoods hosting only conservative agents of their 
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own ethnicity. In Schelling’s original model, agents are happy with their neighborhood when it 
includes a certain fraction of desired agents ranging from 0 to 1. To control parameter sweeping, we 
kept the desired fraction of agents fixed at 0.5. This means that agents are happy with their 
neighborhood if those considered as similar are not in a minority condition; moreover, an agent could 
be happy if alone. Neighborhood space is calculated as an in-radius of 1.5. With Schelling’s 
dynamics, agents do not move if a satisfactory proportion of desired agents live in their neighborhood. 
We differentiated our model in this regard. In our simulation, agents move within a neighborhood if 
they are satisfied with its composition; if dissatisfied, they relocate elsewhere. We made this change 
to increase the likelihood of intergroup interaction and to simulate how people’s sense of security 
(Berry, 2017) influences their exploration of the world. Due to this decision, we do not envision the 
model achieving a stable equilibrium, and the model does not feature a stop rule. The formula below 
represents the behavior of agents: 
 
𝑓௜஼ =
∑ (஼⊂ா೔)೔∈೤
ே೔∈೤
   𝑓௜௅ =
∑ (௅)೔∈೤
ே೔∈೤
 
 
where: 
𝑓௜஼ = fitness of conservative agent i 
𝑓௜௅ = fitness of liberal agent i 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑦 = neighborhood y of agent i 
𝐶 ⊂ 𝐸ூ = conservative agents of the ethnic group E of agent i 
𝐿 = liberal agents of both ethnic groups 
𝑁௜∈௬ = total number of agents in neighborhood y of agent i 
If 𝑓௜ ≥ 0.5, agent i moves within the neighborhood 
If 𝑓௜ < 0.5, agent i relocates elsewhere 
 
Following Berry’s definition of a psychological-individual level of adaptation in acculturation 
processes (2005), the initial conservatism of agents varies as a function of reciprocity or rejection in 
intergroup interactions. The segregation dynamics in the host country that have been described 
influence the probability of interaction. At each step, agents propose an interaction with others in the 
neighborhood (in-radius 1.5) regardless of their ethnicity or conservatism. In making this choice, we 
assumed that any person is potentially connected with others in his or her spatial proximity. Ingroup 
interactions occur by default; intergroup interactions are accepted by liberal agents and rejected by 
conservative agents. In our view, this assumption distinguishes between the behavior expected from 
liberal versus conservative agents in an intercultural context. The individual level of conservatism of 
each agent increases following their experiences of intergroup rejection and decreases due to 
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intergroup acceptance. For experiences of both acceptance and rejection, the highest value is kept in 
memory is as follows: 
 
𝑐௜,௧ = 𝑐௜,௧ିଵ + 𝑚𝑎𝑥௜
௥௘௝ − 𝑚𝑎𝑥௜௔௖௖ 
 
where: 
𝑐௜,௧ = conservatism of agent i at time step t 
𝑐௜,௧ିଵ= conservatism of agent i at time step t-1 
𝑚𝑎𝑥௜
௥௘௝ = maximal experience of rejection of agent i 
𝑚𝑎𝑥௜௔௖௖= maximal experience of acceptance of agent i 
 
Note that 𝑐௜,௧ at time step 0 follows the distribution of collective conservatism of ethnic group of agent 
i 
 
Once agents are no longer in the same neighborhood due to their movements, the local interaction 
breaks, although the maximal experience of rejection and maximal experience of acceptance are kept 
in the memory of the agent. 
Based on the dynamics thus described, the acculturation categories in Berry’s model are defined as 
the types of direct links that an agent receives; these links simulate participation in each ethnic group 
(see Figure 3): 
 
● Integration: The agent receives interactions from the ingroup and out-group 
● Assimilation: The agent receives interactions from the out-group, but not from the ingroup 
● Separation: The agent receives interactions from the ingroup, but not from the out-group 
● Marginalization: The agent receives interactions from neither of the groups 
 
 
Figure 2. Prototype of MigrAgent model 
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Figure 3. Stylized acculturation outcomes simulated in MigrAgent. Acculturation refers to the agent 
in dashed circle: A integration, B assimilation, C separation, D marginalization. Images are 
elaborated for grey-scale printing. 
 
Experiments and Results 
We used MigrAgent to explore the polarization dynamics and associated acculturation outcomes 
emerging from the interaction between a migrant and a local population in relation to network 
formation combining different levels of conservatism in both populations. We were additionally 
interested in how these outcomes varied depending on the speed of intake. To this end, we performed 
parameter sweeping, varying the parameters of the collective conservatism of the local population, 
the conservatism of the migrant population and the speed of intake. For the level of collective 
conservatism, we selected five conditions in both the migrant and the local population. The first 
condition was that of an equal distribution between liberals and conservatives (conservatism = 0). 
The other conditions were liberal societies (conservatism = -0.25), extremely liberal societies 
(conservatism = -0.75), conservative societies (conservatism = 0.25) and extremely conservative 
societies (conservatism = 0.75). For speed of intake, we selected condition 1 (minimum speed = 1% 
of the migrant population moves to the host country at each step) and 100 (maximal speed = 100% 
of the migrant population moves to the host country at each step). The number of agents was kept 
constant in all conditions: 500 local agents and 500 migrant agents. We computed a total of 50 
combinations and counted 1,000 time steps for each simulation. Each simulation was repeated 20 
times. Table 2 summarizes the parameter sweeps and experimental conditions. To avoid incremental 
effects of feedback in intergroup interactions, we put a limit to the change of conservatism of agent, 
equal to +1 for the upper level and -1 for the lower level. Agents change their individual level of 
conservatism as long it falls into the range. Outlier agents who fall out of the limit in the initial 
distribution at time step 0 do not change their individual level of conservatism, thus serving as noise 
to test the robustness of the model across the conditions. Results refer to the averaged scores out of 
the 20 repetitions. 
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Parameters Values 
conservatism_local -0.75 
Extremely 
liberal 
-0.25 
liberal 
0 
equally 
distributed 
0.25 
conservative 
0.75 
Extremely 
conservative 
conservatism_migrant -0.75 
extremely 
liberal 
-0.25 
liberal 
0 
equally 
distributed 
0.25 
conservative 
0.75 
extremely 
conservative 
speed_intake 1 
slow 
100 
fast 
 
number_local 500  
number_migrant 500 
Time steps 1000  
Repetition runs 20  
Table 2. Parameter sweeps and experimental conditions 
 
Describing our results, we first show a polarization effect at the macro-level of our observations. 
Then, we illustrate the acculturation processes along the simulation for substrata of society (liberal 
migrants, conservative migrants, liberal locals, conservative locals). Figure 4 serves as a baseline 
indicating the initial values of the simulation at time step 0 for each condition. Values reported in 
Figure 4 refer both to the local and migrant populations. Conservatism informs the mean level of 
conservatism in each population (i.e., how conservative or liberal the population is). The other two 
components of Figure 4 (rectangles) inform the fraction of liberals and migrants (i.e., how many 
agents of the category are in the population). 
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Figure 4. Baseline of conservatism mean, fraction of conservative agents and liberal agents at the 
start of the simulations (time step 0) 
 
Figure 5 depicts the level of conservatism in each condition at the end of the simulation runs (final 
time step 1,000). The figures compare the migrant population (on the top) and local population (on 
the bottom), and for each observation, the slow intake speed and the fast intake speed are compared. 
Slow intake implies that approximately 250 migrants have entered the receiving society at time step 
1,000, whereas fast intake means all 500 migrants have entered. Thus, the different intake speeds are 
a proxy for relative group sizes, with the migrant group in a minority condition in the slow intake 
condition. On the x-axis, the range of collective local conservatism at time step 0 is reported; on the 
y-axis, the range of collective migrant conservatism at time step 0 is reported. The cells in the heatmap 
report the average level of conservatism for that population. At first glance, for both of the 
populations, it is clear how polarization effects emerge with the tendency towards greater 
conservatism for conditions on the upper right-hand side of the diagonal and towards lower 
conservatism for conditions on the lower left-hand side of the diagonal. The heatmap provides an 
indication of how resilient one group is to the rejection of the other group. When more tolerant 
societies meet, they both shift to lower levels of conservatism (higher tolerance). Likewise, 
interactions between more conservative societies produce a shift towards greater conservatism for 
both. The local population is more sensitive to the degree of conservatism of the migrants than vice 
versa. The speed of intake of migrants has a stronger effect on the conservatism of the local 
population than on the migrants’ degree of conservatism. For the migrant population, fast intake 
seems associated with a larger polarization effect. Figure 6 illustrates the acculturation outcomes that 
emerge at the global level for each population at time step 1,000. Values very close to 0 do not appear 
in the figures. The results highlight that integration and separation are the dominant scenarios. 
Conditions with convergence towards lower conservatism show integration as the dominant outcome, 
whereas for conditions with convergence towards greater conservatism, separation is the dominant 
outcome. 
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Figure 5. Conservatism mean at time step 1,000 for migrant and local population within slow and 
fast intake 
 
 
Figure 6. Acculturation outcomes at time step 1,000 
 
Figure 7 reports the change in the fraction of liberals and conservatives in the migrant and local 
populations over the 1,000 time steps. Grey color refers to local population, black color refers to 
migrant population, while solid lines represent the fraction of liberal agents in each population and 
dotted lines conservative one. 
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Figure 7. Emerging fraction liberal and conservative agents in local and migrant population over 
1,000 time steps 
 
In Figures 8,9,10 and 11, we explore the acculturation categories for each substratum of society over 
1,000 time steps that can be compared with the change in the fraction of liberal or conservative agents 
as in Figure 7. The same graph is repeated for liberal migrants, conservative migrants, liberal locals 
and conservative locals. Each line represents the fraction of agents of the substratum that engages in 
that acculturation outcome. 
As regards liberal migrants (Figure 8), assimilation is more evident in the early time steps of the 
simulation, but eventually it is overcome by integration. This outcome reflects how liberal migrants 
benefit from the availability of liberal locals they have more chance to interact with when in the 
condition of minority. The trend is more evident in the row for extremely conservative migrant 
population (conservatism = 0.75) in the slow intake condition. Comparing with Figure 7, we observe 
how integration becomes eventually the dominant outcome as long as at least a small part of liberals 
survives in both groups. When liberal agents turn conservative due to rejection by conservatives, 
surviving liberal migrants can still engage in assimilation for conditions of low conservatism in the 
local population (conservatism below 0). When the availability of liberal locals is not possible in the 
more conservative local population, separation emerges since liberal migrants can only find similar 
in their own ethnic group. In the fast intake condition, the change towards conservatism as effect of 
rejection is more drastic, with the extinction of liberal migrants when collective conservatism of either 
of the populations is above 0.  
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Conservative migrants (Figure 9) exhibit similar patterns but with opposite acculturation outcomes. 
In the early time steps of simulation runs, when conservative migrants are in the minority, 
marginalization arises for all combinations. The trend is more evident for slow intake conditions. This 
outcome happens because the conservative migrants, who are in the minority, refuse to interact with 
both the local population and liberal migrants. When more conservative agents enter the receiving 
society, separation is more prominent. In the fast intake condition, a trend toward separation emerges 
continuously and steadily already from the first time steps of the simulation. In the condition of 
extremely liberal societies (i.e., conservatism for both populations equal to -0.75), the conservative 
migrants disappear; they become liberals as effect of intergroup acceptance. 
For liberal locals (Figure 10), an increase in separation appears for the first time steps, then overcome 
by integration. This result might seem counterintuitive, especially when extremely liberal migrant or 
extremely liberal local populations are involved. Similar to the trend of assimilation of liberal 
migrants, the reason is the unbalanced group sizes, which results in more opportunities for locals to 
interact with liberal members of the own group rather than migrants. As migrants enter the host 
society, integration steadily increases. When intake is fast, the convergence towards integration is 
more rapid, although at a lower rate than liberal migrants Interestingly, Figure 7 shows that the 
fractions of liberal migrants and liberal locals are almost identical. This similarity seems not reflected 
in the acculturation outcomes of the two populations comparing figure 8 and 10, and more evidently 
for the interaction of extremely liberal local population and extremely conservative migrant 
population. In this condition, liberal locals show integration at a much lower level than liberal 
migrants, both for slow intake and fast intake. The reason is likely to be again the relative group sizes. 
Since ingroup interactions occur by default, liberal locals have a higher probability to interact with 
other liberals of the own ethnic group than with liberal migrants. Additionally, although liberal locals 
would not aggregate with conservative locals, they have a high probability to relocate close to them 
due to the simple effect of larger group size. Therefore, diverse conditions favor segregation of liberal 
locals as simple effect of higher availability of co-ethnics. 
Finally, the results for conservative locals (Figures 11) are not unexpected. They show more 
separation, and the trend follows the line of their distribution within the local population as shown in 
Figure 7. We can conclude that this outcome is a simple effect of unbalanced groups: the local 
population represents the majority, making it relatively easy for conservative locals to connect with 
others similar to themselves. As such, the lowest degree of separation for conservative locals is 
reached for conditions of fast intake and extremely liberal migrant societies, when they turn liberal 
because of the effect of intergroup acceptance 
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Figure 8. Acculturation outcomes for liberal migrants 
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Figure 9. Acculturation outcomes for conservative migrants 
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Figure 10. Acculturation outcomes for liberal locals 
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Figure 11. Acculturation outcomes for conservative locals 
 
Our findings have implications regarding acculturation processes. First, the simulations demonstrate 
that different acculturation processes can coexist for different strata of society, and even within the 
same stratum. Slow intake influences acculturation processes through effects on relative group sizes. 
Acculturation strategies can emerge as a transitory stage, as seen with the liberal migrants’ shift from 
assimilation to integration and the conservative migrants’ shift from marginalization to separation. 
Counterintuitive scenarios, such as the separation of liberal locals in conditions where conservative 
agents represent the majority, are also possible. Furthermore, the simulations identified the effects of 
reciprocity due to acceptance and rejection between liberal and conservatives of the two populations. 
As for liberal migrants, reciprocity causes convergence to low levels of integration and assimilation 
in conditions of great conservatism among locals and migrants. Conversely, liberal locals who 
initially engage in integration shift to separation once they become conservative. 
To check the effect sizes of the parameters involved in our simulations, we ran multiple linear 
regressions for each substratum of the population. Analyses were run in R. To ensure the readability 
of the text, a summary table of the multiple linear regressions is in the supplemental material. The 
dependent variables were the four acculturation outcomes. As for the predictors, we selected the 
emerged percentage of conservative locals, the percentage of conservative migrants, both over the 
1,000 time steps, and the speed of intake as a factor variable. The regression models allowed us to 
compare the direction of causality of the predictors on the observed behavior and to calculate Cohen's 
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𝑓2 for the effect sizes. The index is computed as 𝑓2 =  ௦௥
2
1ିோ2
 , where 𝑠𝑟2 is the squared semi-partial 
correlation and 𝑅2the multiple R2 of the regression model. As a rule of thumb, we maintain that an 
𝑓2 ≥ 0.02 denotes a small effect size, 𝑓2 ≥ 0.15  a medium effect size, and 𝑓2 ≥ 0.35  a large effect 
size (Kabacoff, 2011). The results are noteworthy for the consistent acculturation outcomes in each 
subgroup, as observed in Figures 8,9,10 and 11. As regards the integration of liberal migrants, the 
regression models confirm a negative effect of the percentage of conservative locals and conservative 
migrants, which are the groups that tend to isolate liberal migrants. The speed of intake is positively 
related to the integration of liberal migrants and negatively related to their assimilation. The Cohen's 
𝑓2 for intake speed is 𝑓2 = 0.28 for integration of liberal migrants and 𝑓2 = 0.32 for assimilation of 
liberal migrants, close to a large effect size. As for conservative migrants, the percentage of 
conservative locals is negatively related to separation and positively related to marginalization. In 
contrast, the percentage of conservative migrants is positively linked to separation and negatively 
linked to marginalization. 
The effect of conservative locals on separation of conservative migrants seems counterintuitive, and 
it might depend on the role of the other types of agents and reciprocity effects. On the contrary, the 
other results fit the theoretical assumptions of the model. Increased number of conservative locals 
favors their chance to cluster, with the exclusion of conservative migrants and the increase in their 
marginalization. At the same time, the large number of conservative migrants increases the chance of 
interaction with other similar migrants, with the result to increase separation and buffer against 
marginalization. As for speed of intake, larger group size is positively associated with the separation 
of conservative migrants and negatively associated with their marginalization, because of the 
influence on the probability of interaction. For both cases, Cohen's 𝑓2 indicates a large effect size 
(𝑓ଶ = 0.40). As for liberal locals, an interesting result is that an increased percentage of conservative 
locals is negatively related to integration at a high rate, due to the rejection of liberals by conservatives 
because of the different attitude. The speed of intake exhibits large effect sizes for integration 
(𝑓ଶ = 1.72) and marginalization (𝑓ଶ = 0.43), although R² for integration outcome is suspiciously 
high and more likely due to a simple effect. Finally, for conservative locals, the observations can be 
interpreted as a simple effect of their distribution, and indeed, the results of regression models are 
spurious. 
 
Comparison with Empirical Data 
We qualitatively compared the assumptions and observations of our model with data from the second 
wave of the Causes and Consequences of Socio-Cultural Integration Processes among New 
Immigrants in Europe (SCIP) survey in Germany (Diel et al., 2015). The survey is a panel study 
interested in the antecedents of the adaptation of first-generation migrants in four European countries: 
Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, and the UK. We focused on the second wave (2012/2013) after 
one year of residence in the country. Although one year of adaptation might not be a long enough 
time period when considering acculturation, the items of the survey seemed to be appropriate proxies 
for the parameters of our model. We selected the German sample because of consistency in the 
number of participants as compared to other countries’ samples; moreover, the data collected best fit 
our model parameters. After approximating normality assumptions to run multiple linear regression 
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models, we were left with a final sample of 1,224 migrants of Polish and Turkish origins. Analysis 
can be reproduced via the R-code provided. 
Table 3 illustrates the items we selected as proxies for the parameters in our model and their ranges. 
As for the typology of networks as the dependent variable, we selected the frequency of interactions 
with locals and co-ethnics. As for the predictors in our model, we selected the experience of rejection 
as a proxy for rejection in the host country, the experience of hospitality as a proxy for acceptance 
and the importance of the country of birth as a proxy for the conservatism of individuals. 
 
 
Proxy for Item Range Scale 
Conservatism IPIDCB: How important is the following to 
your sense of who you are: the country where 
you were born? 
1: very important 
4: not important at 
all 
Rejection DSCRFREQ: […] How often do you think CO 
people are discriminated against in RC? 
1: very often 
5: never 
Acceptance HOSP_RC: In general, RC is a 
hospitable/welcoming country for [CO 
people/pl]? 
1: strongly agree 
5: strongly 
disagree 
Interactions 
with locals 
PPRC: How often do you spend time with [RC 
people/pl]? 
1: every day 
6: never 
Interactions 
with co-ethnics 
PPCO: How often do you spend time with [CO 
people/pl]? 
1: every day 
6: never 
RC: receiving country; CO: country of origin 
Table 3. Items from SCIP survey used as proxy in our analyses 
 
We ran multiple linear regressions to detect the direction of causality between the predictors and types 
of networks and then checked if the results fit the observed processes of our model. For the 
interpretation of the results, one should refer to the scale range of the items in Table 3. As for 
interactions with locals (Table 4), the negative coefficient b for conservatism implies that the more 
important participants considered their country of birth (1 = very important) in defining themselves 
(proxy for conservatism), the fewer interactions they had with locals of other ethnicity (6 = never). 
Conversely, the less important people considered their country of birth in defining themselves (4 = 
not important), the more likely they were to interact with locals (1 = every day). As for rejection, the 
same interpretation of the negative coefficient b applies. People who reported high levels of rejection 
(1 = very often) were less likely to interact with locals (6 = never), whereas people who reported 
lower levels of rejection (5 = never) were more likely to interact with locals (1 = every day). The 
same held true for the positive coefficient b for acceptance: Migrants who felt accepted in the host 
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country (1 = strongly agree) were more likely to connect with locals (1 = every day), whereas people 
who did not feel accepted (5 = strongly disagree) were less likely to connect with them (6 = never). 
As for interactions with co-ethnics (Table 5), the positive direction of coefficient b for conservatism 
fits our model, meaning that migrants considering their country of birth as very important to their 
self-definition (1 = very important) were more likely to interact with co-ethnics (1 = every day), and 
those who did not value their country of birth as much (4 = not important at all) were less likely to 
interact with co-ethnics (6 = never). We can expect rejection by the local population to be positively 
related to interactions with co-ethnics, as happens in our model with segregation patterns due to 
effects of intergroup rejection. Although coefficient b is positive and effect size strong (𝑓ଶ = 0.57), 
its magnitude is close to 0 and p-value not significant, so that our hypothesis cannot be confirmed. 
As regards the effect of acceptance by locals on interactions with co-ethnics, we cannot formulate 
firm hypothesis considering ingroup interactions happen by default in our model, and unless attitude 
of migrants and spatial sorting are taken into consideration. As a matter of fact, coefficient b for 
experience of acceptance by locals denotes a null correlation, and a not significant p-value. 
In sum, the regression analyses confirmed the plausibility of our model’s results, in particular for 
interactions with locals with significant results. Yet, the magnitude of coefficient b, as compared to 
the simple regression and partial R², was not very large. Namely for interactions with co-ethnics, the 
results did not strongly support our model. Additionally, the effect sizes (Cohen's 𝑓2) were strong for 
the effects of rejection and acceptance on interactions with locals and co-ethnics. Nevertheless, 
predicted interactions with co-ethnics were not associated with significant p-values for all predictors, 
except for the proxy for conservatism. 
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Interactions with locals 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
conservatism -0.275 0.020 -0.15 0.08 0.09 3.01e-06*** 
experience rejection -0.169 0.012 -0.14 0.63 0.66 0.0017** 
experience 
acceptance 
0.126 0.008 0.12 1.27 1.33 0.0204* 
(Intercept) 2.812     < 2e-16*** 
R² 0.046     3.089e-10*** 
Adj R² 0.043      
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Table 4. Summary multiple linear regression model with SCIP data for interactions with locals 
 
Interactions with co-ethnics 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
conservatism 0.179 0.013 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.000368*** 
experience rejection 0.051 0.001 0.04 0.56 0.57 0.268089 
experience 
acceptance 
0.018 -0.002 0.00 0.45 0.46 0.701909 
(Intercept) 1.640     1.83e-12*** 
R² 0.014     0.002499** 
Adj R² 0.011      
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Table 5. Summary multiple linear regression model with SCIP data for interactions with co-ethnics 
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Limitations and Conclusions 
In this preliminary work, we have presented our MigrAgent model and demonstrated how different 
acculturation processes can emerge and coexist for different groups in society in a stylized scenario. 
We have also explored these processes’ association with polarization dynamics. We think our work 
shows that agent-based modelling can be a valuable contribution to the study of acculturation, but we 
recognize much must be done to increase the validity of our model. A main challenge in the work 
presented herein was the comparison with real data. We recognize that although the selected empirical 
data reasonably support our model, they are not very strong for multiple reasons. First of all, these 
were secondary data we adopted as proxies for our parameters, and so the meanings of the items 
might not fit those of the model. This could explain the lack of consistency for interactions with 
locals. Even if we could access data fitting the meanings of the parameters of our model, we would 
need historical data to validate the processes in MigrAgent. Additionally, the sample of SCIP do not 
include locals, who are a class of actors included in our model. A survey specifically designed to feed 
our simulation might be envisioned in the future, testing the hypothesis generated by the processes 
observed in MigrAgent and addressing specifically the interaction between locals and migrants over 
time. On the theoretical level, one issue regards the definition of acculturation. Migrant integration is 
a complex phenomenon that can be studied from a psychological, structural or intergenerational 
perspective (Rumbaut, 2015). At this stage, our model allows us to differentiate between an individual 
and a collective level, which is the main purpose of agent-based modelling (Squazzoni, Jager, & 
Edmonds, 2013). Although this feature can be an asset in the study of acculturation processes, it is 
still necessary to consider what specific areas of the literature might benefit from the model and how 
its contribution can be best oriented. Here, we have focused on networks in terms of the participation 
of individuals from different cultures (Berry, 2005). This approach fits our research question, but 
many other dimensions should be included, depending on the definition of acculturation. A critical 
one is the dimension of power. The asymmetrical power relations between locals and migrants have 
been widely recognized (Verkuyten, Yogeeswaran, & Adelman, 2018), which justifies the focus on 
exploring the dynamics of opinion polarization in receiving countries. However, adding a dimension 
of power would imply the inclusion of additional parameters and different mechanisms of interaction 
between the two populations. For the sake of the model’s simplicity at this stage, we avoided such 
considerations in this study. Finally, the results of our simulations illustrate strong polarization 
between integration and separation, which might have obscured more nuanced marginalization and 
assimilation conditions. We theorize these results were due to the choice to keep the desired fraction 
of similar others at 0.50, which means that agents would relocate as soon as those considered as 
similar are in the minority condition. This scenario increases chances of spatial segregation of agents 
and consequently influences formation of agents’ network in their proximity. Nevertheless, our 
parameter sweeping already included too many conditions to compare, and we opted for this choice. 
Sweeping the fraction of desired others would be a feasible area of investigation in the future, so to 
better understand how spatial sorting influences the network formation. Further studying could also 
include thorough tests on the robustness of the model and boundary effects on the distribution of 
conservatism in the groups. 
Even recognizing certain limits due to the preliminary status of our work, we think MigrAgent can 
provide a useful basis for the study of acculturation dynamics and the conditions under which mutual 
acceptance can emerge or fail, resulting in different scenarios for societal network structures. The 
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main contribution of the model is that it compares different types of societies and strata for multiple 
groups, in this case along the dimension of conservatism/liberalism. In the future, societies or their 
strata might differ along other dimensions, such as the internal distribution of wealth within groups 
(Bergreen & Nilsson, 2003) or the similarity of cultural models and practices (Hofstede, 2001). An 
asset of MigrAgent is its ability to translate these social dynamics into scenarios linking migration 
flows and post-migration adaptation. We aim in the future to parameterize MigrAgent using available 
data to further improve its empirical grounding and conduct studies on specific cases of different 
migration scenarios. 
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Diehl, C., Gijsberts, M., Güveli, A., Koenig, M., Kristen, C., Lubbers, M., McGinnity, F., Mühlau, 
P., Platt, L., & Van Tubergen, F. (2016). Causes and consequences of socio-cultural integration 
processes among new immigrants in Europe (SCIP). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5956 Data 
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Supplemental Material 
 
Multiple Linear Regression Models Simulations 
R²: Multiple R²; Adj R²: Adjusted R²; b: regression coefficient; r: correlation coefficient; sr²: 
squared semi-partial correlation; Cohen f²: effect size 
 
Integration Liberal Migrants 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals -0.363 0.016 -0.67 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 *** 
% conservative migrants -0.151 0.003 -0.66 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 *** 
Speed intake 0.197 0.130 0.42 0.12 0.28 <2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 0.809 
 
<2e-16 *** 
R² 0.570 
    
 
Adj R² 0.570 
    
 
       
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Assimilation Liberal Migrants 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals 0.197 0.005 0.47 0.00 0.00 < 2e-16 *** 
% conservative migrants 0.065 0.001 0.45 0.00 0.00 3.72e-07 *** 
Speed intake -0.252 0.212 -0.51 0.20 0.32 < 2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 0.254 
 
< 2e-16 *** 
R² 0.388 
    
 
Adj R² 0.388 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Multiple Linear Regression Models Simulations 
R²: Multiple R²; Adj R²: Adjusted R²; b: regression coefficient; r: correlation coefficient; sr²: 
squared semi-partial correlation; Cohen f²: effect size 
 
 
Separation Liberal Migrants 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals 0.158 0.011 0.58 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 *** 
% conservative migrants 0.088 0.003 0.58 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 *** 
Speed intake 0.061 0.048 0.04 0.04 0.07 <2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) -0.066 
 
<2e-16 *** 
R² 0.374 
    
 
Adj R² 0.374 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
Marginalization Liberal Migrants 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals 0.008 0.001 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.28e-09 *** 
% conservative migrants -0.002 0.000 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.0883 . 
Speed intake -0.005 0.012 -0.14 0.01 0.01 < 2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 0.004 
 
< 2e-16 *** 
R² 0.029 
    
 
Adj R² 0.029 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Multiple Linear Regression Models Simulations 
R²: Multiple R²; Adj R²: Adjusted R²; b: regression coefficient; r: correlation coefficient; sr²: 
squared semi-partial correlation; Cohen f²: effect size 
 
 
Separation Conservative Migrants 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals -0.117 0.002 0.01 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 *** 
% conservative migrants 0.189 0.005 0.03 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 *** 
Speed intake 0.312 0.294 0.54 0.28 0.40 <2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 0.634 
 
<2e-16 *** 
R² 0.303 
    
 
Adj R² 0.303 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Marginalization Conservative Migrants 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals 0.117 0.002 -0.01 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 
% conservative migrants -0.189 0.005 -0.03 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 
Speed intake -0.312 0.294 -0.54 0.28 0.40 <2e-16 
(Intercept) 0.366 
 
<2e-16 
R² 0.303 
    
 
Adj R² 0.303 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Multiple Linear Regression Models Simulations 
R²: Multiple R²; Adj R²: Adjusted R²; b: regression coefficient; r: correlation coefficient; sr²: 
squared semi-partial correlation; Cohen f²: effect size 
 
 
Integration Liberal Locals 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals -0.803 0.19 -0.92 0.01 0.06 < 2e-16 *** 
% conservative migrants -0.059 0.11 -0.90 0.00 0.00 3.03e-15 *** 
Speed intake 0.153 0.22 0.35 0.21 1.72 < 2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 0.774 
 
< 2e-16 *** 
R² 0.881 
    
 
Adj R² 0.881 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
Assimilation Liberal Locals 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals -0.001 0.00 -0.29 0.00 0.00 1.14e-12 *** 
% conservative migrants 0.000 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.00 2.28e-06 *** 
Speed intake 0.001 0.05 0.25 0.04 0.05 < 2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 0.002 
 
< 2e-16 *** 
R² 0.124 
    
 
Adj R² 0.124 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Multiple Linear Regression Models Simulations 
R²: Multiple R²; Adj R²: Adjusted R²; b: regression coefficient; r: correlation coefficient; sr²: 
squared semi-partial correlation; Cohen f²: effect size 
 
 
Separation Liberal Locals 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals -0.197 0.01 -0.27 0.00 0.00 < 2e-16 *** 
% conservative migrants 0.060 0.00 -0.27 0.00 0.00 8.74e-16 *** 
Speed intake -0.153 0.21 -0.39 0.20 0.28 < 2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 0.223 
 
< 2e-16 *** 
R² 0.271 
    
 
Adj R² 0.271 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
Marginalization Liberal Locals 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals 0.000 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 *** 
% conservative migrants -0.001 0.33 -0.18 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 *** 
Speed intake -0.001 0.30 -0.51 0.28 0.43 <2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 0.001 
 
<2e-16 *** 
R² 0.331 
    
 
Adj R² 0.331 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Multiple Linear Regression Models Simulations 
R²: Multiple R²; Adj R²: Adjusted R²; b: regression coefficient; r: correlation coefficient; sr²: 
squared semi-partial correlation; Cohen f²: effect size 
 
Separation Conservative Locals 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals 0.995 1.000 1.00 0.04 NA <2e-16 *** 
% conservative migrants -0.002 0.994 0.98 0.00 NA <2e-16 *** 
Speed intake -0.002 0.257 -0.18 0.24 NA <2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 0.000 
 
<2e-16 *** 
R² 1.000 
    
 
Adj R² 1.000 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Marginalization Conservative Locals 
Predictor b partial R² r sr² Cohen f² p-value 
% conservative locals 0.005 0.079 0.87 0.00 0.02 <2e-16 *** 
% conservative migrants 0.002 0.817 0.87 0.00 0.00 <2e-16 *** 
Speed intake 0.002 0.257 0.09 0.24 1.38 <2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 0.000 
 
<2e-16 *** 
R² 0.822 
    
 
Adj R² 0.822 
    
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
